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Abstract. Along with the oil price, concerns about the security of energy supply have
soared once again in recent years. Yet, some 40 years after the OPEC oil embargo in
1973, there is no widely accepted statistical measure that captures the notion of energy
security. Most likely, this deficit is the result of the great variety of resource economic
aspects that are of potential relevance. This paper develops a statistical risk indicator
that aims at characterizing the physical energy supply vulnerability of nations that are
heavily dependent on energy imports. Our risk indicator condenses the empirical infor-
mation on the imports of the whole range of fossil fuels, originating from a multitude
of export countries, as well as data on their indigenous contribution to domestic energy
supply, into a single figure. Applying the proposed concept to empirical energy data
on Germany and the U.S. (1980-2007), we find that there is a large gap in the supply
risks between both countries, with Germany suffering much more from a tight energy
supply situation today than the U.S.
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1 Introduction
Some 40 years after the OPEC oil embargo in 1973, there is still no widely accepted sta-
tistical measure of energy security (LO¨SCHEL et al., 2010:1665). Most likely, this deficit
is the result of the great variety of resource economic concepts, such as absolute and
relative scarcity, that are of potential relevance.1 In fact, given the multitude of facets of
the notion of energy security, including physical, economic, social and environmental
dimensions (CONSTANTINI et al. 2007:210), it appears to be hardly possible to integrate
all of them into a single indicator.
Virtually all measures developed so far therefore concentrate on particular as-
pects of energy security. Basically, these aspects can be divided along two dimensions
(GRUBB et al. 2006:4051): (i) dependence or vulnerability measures and (ii) physical
versus economic indicators, a categorization that is by no means beyond controversy.
Physical measures reflect the relative level of imports or prospects for shortages and
disruptions, whilst economic measures describe the cost of fuels and energy supply or
prospects for price shocks. While vulnerability refers to an economy’s entire exposure
to energy supply shocks or price spikes, dependence relates to an economy’s reliance
on a particular fuel source.
In accordance with the multi-dimensionality of the notion of energy security,
numerous contributions to the literature have developed and employed quantitative
measures to capture diverse resource economic aspects, with BLUM and LEGEY (2012),
JANSEN and SEEBREGTS (2010), LO¨SCHEL et al. (2010), LEFE`VRE (2010, 2007), LE COQ
and PALTSEVA (2009), FRONDEL and SCHMIDT (2008), SCHEEPERS et al. (2006, 2007),
GRUBB et al. (2006), CONSTANTINI et al. (2007), NEUMANN (2007, 2004), and JANSEN et
al. (2004) being among the most recent studies. While we find the work of JANSEN et
al. (2004) particularly inspiring, the present article suggests an alternative concept that
is based on HERFINDAHL’s (1950) concentration index, rather than SHANNON’s (1948)
diversity measure, thereby conceiving a risk indicator instead of a measure of supply
1While the notion of absolute scarcity focuses on the potential exhaustion of resources such as oil or
gas, relative scarcity denotes transient resource shortages, for instance due to missing supply capacities.
1
security, as will become transparent from our discussion below.
While taking account of all energy sources used in a country, both renewable and
non-renewable, the basic ingredients of our measure are (1) a country’s own contribu-
tion to the total domestic supply of any fuel, (2) the fuels’ import shares, and (3) the
probabilities of supply disruptions in export countries. With its focus on the aspect
of relative scarcity,2 our measure’s empirical outcome is a single figure that character-
izes a country’s total risk of physical shortages originating from its reliance on fossil
fuel imports. Ignoring both resource prices and their volatility, this statistical indicator
aims at quantifying the long-term energy supply risk, with its values reflecting poten-
tial (risk-weighted) fossil fuel import losses, albeit not their economic consequences. In
other words, our measure may be classified as an indicator of resource vulnerability or
physical (un-)availability.
The risk of physical unavailability is, as LEFE`VRE (2010:1636) points out, of major
concern wherever prices do not reflect the demand and supply situation in a market,
most notably, if prices are the result of a regulated, rather than a competitive mar-
ket setting.3 Specifically, our measure may be particularly well-suited if the supply
is constrained by infrastructure, such as a natural gas pipeline. In that case, a coun-
try’s supply reduction, such as Russia’s temporary gas supply interruptions both at the
beginning of 2006 and 2009, could translate into actual shortages, rather than price in-
creases. In contrast, this measure may provide for a poor picture of reality when supply
is flexible and relatively homogeneous, as in the case of petroleum.
Furthermore, unlike the Supply-Demand Index proposed by SCHEEPERS et
al. (2006, 2007), our approach does not account for demand reductions, but follows
2The focus on relative scarcity is due to the fact that the eventual exhaustion of energy resources, such
as oil and gas, is not yet imminent (GORDON 2005:122-123). In a similar vein, more recent contributions
to the resource economics literature than GRAY (1914) and HOTELLING (1931), such as ADELMAN (1990,
1993) and GORDON (1967), are based on the assumption that the exhaustion of resources does not bear
any binding restriction.
3Although there may be a myriad of causes for welfare losses resulting from frictions in the energy
markets, according to LEFE`VRE (2010:1635), none appears to be as pervasive and politicized as physical
unavailability that is due to fossil fuel concentration.
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conventional tacks that take the demand for energy as exogenously given, thereby fo-
cusing on the supply side. Therefore, our indicator does not provide for any answers
on the effects of raising energy taxes, nor on many other issues. Not least, our measure
ignores the issue of fungibility, that is, the ease of switching between suppliers and
supply alternatives in case of supply disruptions. Natural gas supplied via pipeline,
for instance, is less substitutable in the short-run than Liquified Natural Gas (LNG)
that is delivered by tank ships. We believe, though, that the issue of fungibility is pri-
marily relevant in the short-run, but not in the long-term. These limitations should be
borne in mind when interpreting the values resulting from our indicator.
The following section elaborates on our statistical indicator characterizing the
long-term primary energy supply risk of a country. In Section 3, the proposed concept
is applied to empirical energy data on Germany and the U.S. This choice is motivated
by the fact that the U.S. is a country with rich natural resources, whereas Germany is
heavily dependent on oil and gas imports. The last section summarizes and concludes.
2 A Measure of the Physical Energy Supply Risk
To address the issue of substitution between fuel types, in line with LE COQ and PALT-
SEVA (2009), we first conceive a fuel-specific indicator that characterizes the long-term
physical supply risk for each type of fossil fuel. In fact, an important feature of our ag-
gregate risk indicator is that it is a weighted average of fuel-specific risks. The weights
are the relative contributions of a fuel to the overall primary energy supply of a coun-
try, including domestically produced fossil fuels, as well as bio-fuels and electricity and
heat generation from renewables.
In a similar vein, the specific risks are weighted averages of both the import shares
from foreign countries and the indigenous contribution to domestic supply, with the
weights consisting of the product of the countries’ relative supply levels and country-
specific risks. This approach distinguishes our work from many other studies that pro-
pose an aggregate index alone. Indeed, the empirical example presented in Section
3 strongly motivates the use of fuel-specific risk indicators, as, above all, Germany’s
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exposure to supply risks varies notably across fuel types.
2.1 A Fuel-Specific Risk Indicator
Denoting the risk probability of supply disruptions in export country j by rj, where
0 ≤ rj ≤ 1, and given the choice between two concentration indices, we focus on
HERFINDAHL’s index (see Appendix A for a justification) and suggest the following
quadratic form as a measure to capture a nation’s supply risk related to fuel f :
risk f := xTf · R · x f = x2f d · rd +
J
∑
j=1
x2f j · rj. (1)
A similar definition is suggested by LEFE`VRE (2007:56), although he omits the indige-
nous contribution x f d to the domestic supply of fuel f . Matrix R, which can be desig-
nated as risk matrix, is defined by R :=
√
r · I · (√r)T, where I is the identity matrix and
rT := (rd, r1, ..., rj, ..., rJ)may be denoted as risk vector. It seems natural for import coun-
tries, such as Germany, to set the probability of a long-term disruption of a nation’s own
contribution to its domestic supply to zero: rd = 0, notwithstanding potential transient
short-term supply disruptions. A non-zero probability of domestic supply disruptions,
though, can be easily accommodated in this framework by allowing rd to deviate from
zero, thereby treating the import country in the same way as any other fuel-providing
export country.
From the perspective of an import country, the components of share vector x f , de-
fined by xTf := (x f d, x f 1, ..., x f j, ..., x f J), are the primary instruments to improve supply
security. In the polar case of perfect security in which the supply of fuel f is solely sat-
isfied by perfectly secure countries, a situation characterized by r = 0, the supply risk
related to fuel f , as defined by (1), takes on the minimum value of zero. In the opposite
polar case in which the total supply of fuel f exclusively originates from a single highly
instable export country j such that rj = 1, risk f takes on the maximum value of unity.
In short, the fuel-specific risk defined by (1) is normalized: 0 ≤ risk f ≤ 1 (for a proof of
this proposition, as well as other interesting properties of this indicator, see Appendix
B).
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To sum up, definition (1) comprises three major aspects of energy security: (1)
a country’s own contribution x f d to the total domestic supply of fuel f , (2) the politi-
cal and economic stability of export countries as captured by risk vector r, and (3) the
diversification of imports as reflected by vector x f . The role of diversification is incor-
porated in the fuel-specific indicator risk f by building on HERFINDAHL’s index, which
is known in ecology as SIMPSON diversity index (STIRLING, 1999). Increasing the in-
digenous contribution x f d decreases the contribution x f j of export country j to the total
domestic supply of fuel i, thereby alleviating the import dependency with respect to
fuel f and, hence, risk f . This obvious effect can be seen from the following relation-
ship:
x f j = s f j(1− x f d) for j = 1, ..., J, (2)
where s f j denotes the share of export country j in total imports of fuel f .
Finally, if R is defined by R :=
√
r · I · (√r)T, a tacit assumption underlying risk
definition (1) is that supply disruptions are uncorrelated among export countries. To
take account of cartels of export countries, such as the OPEC cartel, the risk matrix R
must be slightly amended as follows:
Rc :=

rd 0 0 . . . 0
0 r1 0 . . . 0
. . . . . . .
0 0 0 . rc . rc
. . . . . . .
0 0 0 . rc . rc

, (3)
where the cartel discipline is characterized by a common disruption probability rc. The
bloc in the south-east of matrix Rc reflects the correlation of supply disruptions among
cartel member countries. In effect, this amendment amounts to treating all cartel mem-
bers as a single country, whose share is the sum of the members’ individual contribu-
tions x f j.
The assumption underlying Rc implies that the supplies from all cartel members
are concerned even when the supply of only two of them is actually disrupted, as was
the case in the Iran-Iraq war (1979-1980). As a result, in our empirical example pre-
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sented in Section 3, the risk values obtained for the OPEC cartel case can be expected
to be larger than the true risks. It is straightforward, however, to avoid this overesti-
mation: For the case of the Iran-Iraq war, for example, the south-east bloc of Rc may
be reduced to a 2 x 2 sub-matrix with common risk rI , while all the other OPEC cartel
members are treated like any other export country:
RI :=

rd 0 0 . . . . 0
0 r1 0 0 . . . 0
. . . . . . . .
0 0 0 0 . rJ−2 0 0
0 0 0 0 . 0 rI rI
0 0 0 0 . 0 rI rI

. (4)
In short, it bears no fundamental difficulty to integrate the case of supply disruptions
in which several export countries are involved into our concept.
2.2 Overall Risk Indicator
To measure a nation’s entire vulnerability with respect to all kinds of fuel imports, we
suggest evaluating the following generalization of the fuel-specific supply risk defined
by (1):
risk := wT · XT · R · X ·w = wT ·Π ·w, (5)
where wT := (w1, ..., w f , ..., wF) represents a vector whose non-negative components
w f reflect the shares of the various fuels and energy sources in a nation’s total energy
consumption and, hence, add to unity: w1 + ... + wF = 1. The columns of matrix X
comprise the indigenous as well as the export country’s contributions to the domestic
supply of each of the F fuels and energy sources:
X :=

x1d . x f d . xFd
x11 . x f 1 . xF1
. . . . .
x1j x f j xFj
. . . . .
x1J . x f J . xFJ

= (x1 ... xF) . (6)
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The diagonal elements pi f f of the product matrixΠ := XT ·R ·X are identical to the fuel-
specific supply risks: pi f f = risk f = x2f d · rd +∑Jj x2f j · rj ≥ 0. Generally, non-vanishing
off-diagonal elements
pi f1 f2 = x f1d · x f2d · rd +
J
∑
j
x f1 j · x f2 j · rj > 0, where f1, f2 = 1, ..., F, f1 6= f2, (7)
take account of the fact that, for instance, oil supply disruptions in an export country
may be correlated with those of gas. This seems to be highly relevant, as today West-
ern nations are exposed to multiple risks of supply disruptions, such as simultaneous
shortages of oil and gas: Iran, for example, is among the most important oil and gas
producing countries, providing for the risk of serious oil as well as gas supply short-
ages in case of political conflicts.
Note that in the cartel case Rc, both pi f f and pipi f1 f2 , comprise more non-zero ele-
ments than in the case in which risk matrix R is diagonal. As a result, the values of our
total risk indicator are generally higher for Rc than for R. Taking the Iran-Iraq example
with matrix RI given by (4) as an illustration, the off-diagonal elements read as follows:
pi f1 f2 = x f1d · x f2d · rd + (x f1(J−1) + x f1 J)(x f2(J−1) + x f2 J) · rI +
J−2
∑
j
x f1 j · x f2 j · rj. (8)
From this expression, it can be seen that pi f1 f2 is larger than the risk value given by (7)
in case of a diagonal risk matrix R. It also follows from expression (8) that employing
matrix RI amounts to treating both countries J − 1 and J as a single country with risk
common risk rI . Finally, it bears noting that the total supply risk (5) is normalized, as is
intuitive and proved in Appendix B: 0 ≤ risk ≤ 1.
3 Empirical Application
Based on energy data provided by the International Energy Agency (IEA), we now
employ both the fuel-specific as well as the overall supply risk indicators to compare
the inter-temporal changes in the energy supply risks of Germany and the U.S. during
the period 1980 through 2007, as well as their prospects for 2020. The range of the
period 1980-2007 allows us to examine both country’s reactions to the oil price shocks
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of the 1970s, where the first can be traced to the OPEC oil embargo in 1973, while the
second shock was the result of the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the subsequent war
between Iran and Iraq in 1980.
The probabilities rj of supply disruptions in individual export countries are iden-
tified here primarily by applying the OECD (2008) system used for assessing country
credit risks, where countries are classified into eight risk categories (0-7), with 7 stand-
ing for the highest risk category. Examples of these country-specific classifications,
which we have re-scaled to lie within the range of zero to unity, are displayed in Table
C1 of Appendix C. Although commonly used to gauge loan loss risks, these classifica-
tions should also satisfactorily characterize a country’s political and economic situation,
as political risks and other risk factors are integrated into the OECD assessment as well.
These classifications are assumed here to be inter-temporally constant, an assump-
tion that turns out to be inconsequential, as the classification of an individual country
hardly changes over time. Alternatively using the contemporaneous classification of
each country leaves our results virtually unaltered. To further check the robustness of
our results, we additionally apply the country classifications provided by the World
Bank (2008). The comparison of the OECD and World Bank assessments provided in
Appendix C indicates that the alternative classifications are quite similar for the major-
ity of countries.
Starting with oil, the most important fossil fuel both in Germany and the U.S. (Ta-
ble 1), we find that both country’s supply risk roughly doubled – in terms of our fuel-
specific indicator – between 1980 and 2007, implying a substantially increasing gap
(Figure 1). A major reason for this finding is that Germany’s reliance on Russian oil has
risen dramatically since the end of the 1970s. At present, Russia is, by far, Germany’s
most important oil provider, being responsible for as much as about 40% of total oil
supply. Actually, Germany suffers much more from today’s tight oil supply situation
than the U.S. This is due to the fact that the substantial decline in U.S. oil production to
only a third of the domestic supply has been almost outweighed by intensified imports
from stable countries such as Canada.4
4Note that using World Bank country classifications instead of those of the OECD virtually leads to
the same conclusions, with the results for the U.S. being identical (Figure 1). This also holds true for the
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Table 1: Primary Energy Supply Mix in Germany and the U.S.
U. S. Germany
1980 1990 2000 2004 2007 2020 1980 1990 2000 2004 2007 2020
Oil 44.4 40.0 38.7 40.7 39.3 39.3 40.8 35.3 38.3 35.9 33.9 35.5
Hard Coal 20.0 22.5 22.6 22.5 22.4 21.4 17.5 15.5 13.4 12.7 14.3 13.0
Gas 26.3 22.8 23.8 22.1 22.9 21.5 14.2 15.4 20.9 22.6 22.5 22.8
Nuclear 3.8 8.3 9.0 9.1 9.2 9.1 4.0 11.2 12.9 12.5 11.1 2.0
Brown Coal 0.8 1.3 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 21.7 20.6 11.3 11.9 11.6 10.7
Other sources 4.7 5.1 4.9 4.6 5.2 7.7 1.8 2.0 3.2 4.4 6.6 16.0
Note: Shares for 1980 through 2007 are based on IEA (2004d, 2006c, 2006d, 2008), shares for 2020 rest on IEA (2007)
for the U.S. and on IER, RWI, ZEW (2010) for Germany. Other sources include hydro, solar, tide, wind power, etc.
Figure 1: Crude Oil Supply Risks in Germany and the U.S. (1980-2007)
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A pattern similar to that for oil can be observed for both country’s natural gas sup-
ply risks (Figure 2). While the moderate reduction of the indigenous share in U. S. gas
supply has been balanced by extending the imports from Canada, in the end stabiliz-
ing the U. S. gas supply risk at the negligible level of the 1980s, the drastic decline of
Germany’s relative own contribution to its domestic gas supply has been countered by
surging gas imports from Russia. Today, the contribution of Russian pipelines to Ger-
many’s gas supply amounts to about 37% and, hence, is almost as high as Russia’s oil
supply share. By contrast, Russian gas played only a minor role for Germany in the
1970s. Note also that Germany’s gas-specific risk closely follows the alterations in the
import shares from Russia and that the gas-specific risk is entirely due to the Russian
imports, as the country risks of Norway and the Netherlands, Germany’s remaining gas
providers, are vanishing. Russia’s dominance in both the German oil and gas procure-
ment are all the more disconcerting as the significance of gas has substantially risen.
The share of gas in Germany’s primary energy supply mix increased from 14.2% in
1980 to 22.5% in 2007 (Table 1).5
Figure 2: Natural Gas Supply Risks in Germany and the U.S. (1980-2007)
supply risk of hard coal (Figure 3) and the total supply risk (Figure 4).
5With particular respect to the different kinds of risk classification, we observe slightly stronger dif-
ferences for the gas supply risks than for those of oil. The major reason for the higher level is the larger
risk attributed to Russia by the World Bank indicators (Table C1).
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In contrast to gas, for which consumption as well as imports have been growing
since the 1970s, Germany’s abundantly available brown coal has lost relative signifi-
cance. Its share in the primary energy supply mix shrank from 21.7% in 1980 to 11.6%
in 2007 (Table 1). Another domestic energy source, German hard coal, experienced a
decline due to the widening gap between domestic production cost and world mar-
ket prices of coal (FRONDEL et al. 2007). Yet, despite its substantial and increasing
economic disadvantages, the indigenous contribution to overall hard coal supply in
Germany merely decreased from about 85% in 1980 to some 33% in 2007, so that the
rise of the specific supply risk was quite moderate (Figure 3). By contrast, renewable
energy technologies such as wind, solar, and hydro power are still of minor importance
for supply security.
While this also holds true for the U.S., there is hardly any reliance on foreign hard
coal, which, aside from oil and gas, is the most important fuel (Table 1). It is not surpris-
ing, therefore, that the risk of hard coal supply virtually vanishes for the U.S. (Figure
3). In short, with the increase in nuclear power, which has partially compensated the
declining share of domestic oil in the U.S. primary energy supply since the 1980s, and a
very low dependence on gas and hard coal imports from instable countries, the U.S. en-
ergy security situation appears to be much better than that of Germany.
Figure 3: Hard Coal Supply Risks in Germany and the U. S. (1980-2007)
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This qualitative conclusion is substantiated by the calculation of the proposed to-
tal supply risk indicator, whose inter-temporal changes are displayed in Figure 4. In
terms of our overall risk indicator, Germany’s energy supply risk appears to be sub-
stantially higher than the U.S. risk. While it roughly doubled between 1980 and 2007 in
the U.S., above all due to the doubling of the oil-specific supply risk in this period, the
total supply risk almost tripled in Germany.
In addition to the increase in the oil-specific supply risk, the major reason for
this development is the growing dependency from hard coal and, most notably, gas
imports. This gap is likely to rise further within the next decades: In addition to the
future decline of German hard coal production, with the end of subsidies being legally
stipulated for 2018, the phase-out decision on nuclear power of 2011 implies that this
energy source disappears from Germany’s primary energy mix until 2022 (Table 1).6 As
a consequence, our indicator points to a further increase in Germany’s energy supply
risk,7 whereas the U.S. risk may decline if the forecasts of the IEA (2007) on the primary
energy supply mix for 2020 become true (Table 1). Actually, the recent decrease in both
U.S. oil and gas imports due to the rise in the domestic production from shale and oil
gas corroborates the expectation that U.S. energy supply risk may even approach zero
until 2020.
The inter-temporal picture appears to be somewhat different (Figure 5) if the
OPEC cartel is taken into account in calculating total supply risks and all OPEC mem-
bers are uniformly characterized as highly instable countries, building a single block of
oil exporters. Attributing the maximum risk of rc = 1 to all OPEC members indicates
that Germany heavily relied on OPEC oil in 1980. Yet, as well as the U.S., Germany has
6Note that our calculations are based on the assumption that nuclear power should be treated as a
domestic resource. The basis for this treatment is the fact that nuclear fuels are frequently imported in
times when prices are low and stored up to several decades before used in nuclear power plants. This
treatment of nuclear fuels as quasi-domestic energy source is also the prevailing practice in international
energy statistics.
7The oil import shares for 2020 are assumed to be the same as in 2007, whereas we have presumed
that the vanishing contribution of German hard coal may be replaced by increases in imports from Rus-
sia. Similarly, gas imports from Russia can be expected to rise as well, most notably due to the recent
establishment of the off-shore pipeline in the Baltic sea that directly conveys gas from Russia to Germany.
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Figure 4: Total Energy Supply Risks in Germany and the U. S. (1980-2007)
Note: All values refer to the situation in Germany in 1980 (1980:100).
managed to reduce this dependency substantially in the aftermath of the oil crises.
Since 1990, however, U.S. energy risk has again increased, because the relative
significance of U.S. oil production has shrunk dramatically until recently. In contrast,
the energy risk remained quite stable in Germany between 1990 and 2007, most no-
tably because the OPEC’s oil supply share decreased from about 40% to less than 20%,
whereas Germany’s reliance on Russian oil imports has almost doubled, to some 40%
in 2007. Given the significantly different values for U.S. risk when the OPEC cartel is
taken into account, it bears noting again that in this case the risk values can be expected
to overestimate the true risks (see Section 2).
4 Summary and Conclusion
In recent decades, numerous developing countries, most notably China, experienced
strong economic growth, requiring more and more mineral and energy resources. As a
consequence, industrialized countries are increasingly struggling to ensure the security
of their energy and resource requirements, leading, for instance, to a strong support
for domestically produced bio-fuels in the U.S. Yet, some 40 years after the OPEC oil
embargo in 1973, there is no widely accepted statistical measure of energy security. This
13
Figure 5: Total Energy Supply Risks in Case of a Strict OPEC Cartel Discipline
Note: All values refer to the situation in Germany in 1980 (1980:100).
is all the more disconcerting given the strong case to explore the long-term evolution of
energy supply security for policy design purposes (JANSEN, SEEBREGTS, 2010:1655).
This paper has conceived a statistical indicator for measuring the long-term pri-
mary energy supply risk of a country. While neglecting fuel prices and their volatility,
but instead focusing on the physical availability of fossil fuels, our indicator includes
four major aspects of long-term supply security: (1) diversification of sources in energy
supply, (2) diversification of fuel imports, (3) long-term political and economic stability
of export countries, and (4) a country’s own contribution to its domestic energy supply.
In the terminology of LO¨SCHEL et al. (2010:1668), who distinguish between ex-
post and ex-ante indicators, our concept is an ex-ante indicator that addresses the issue
of whether one may expect major welfare losses due to future frictions in a country’s
energy markets. There may have been circumstances, however, in which the actual
supply risk had not changed at all over some time interval in the past, even when
our ex-ante indicator would have pointed to a drastic increase in the supply risk over
that interval. This exemplifies that our concept is not an appropriate ex-post indicator,
which according to LO¨SCHEL et al. (2010:1668) should attempt to answer the question
of whether the energy markets caused a major economic friction in the past.
Applying the proposed long-term supply risk indicator to empirical energy data
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on Germany and the U.S. (1980-2007), we find that there is a large gap in the energy sup-
ply risk between both countries, with Germany suffering much more from the tight en-
ergy supply situation today than the U.S. This gap is likely to rise much further within
the next decades: Given the nuclear phase-out decision of 2011 that implies the end
of nuclear power in Germany by 2022, and the legislated dismantling of the hard coal
subsidies by 2018, our calculations show that Germany’s energy supply risk can be ex-
pected to rise even if the national goal of a 35% share of electricity production from
renewable energies will be reached in 2020.
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Appendix A: Candidate Indices
Our concept strongly relies on the notion of diversity, which itself comprises of at least
three subordinate properties: variety, balance, and disparity (STIRLING, 1999:39-40). In
our context, variety refers to the number of energy sources, including fuel categories
such as hard and brown coal, gas, and oil, as well as the number of energy technologies
such as nuclear, solar, and wind power that contribute to the overall energy supply of
a country. Not least, the variety of import sources of fossil fuels is at issue. Balance
refers here to the evenness of the discrete distribution of the shares of export countries
in total imports of a fuel, as well as the evenness of the contributions of diverse fuels
and energy technologies to a nation’s primary energy mix.
Disparity, finally, refers in this case to the differences in the characteristics of di-
verse energy sources and technologies. For example, electricity production from hard
and brown coal are less disparate in terms of short-term supply security than the elec-
tricity generation from wind and solar power, which is well-known to be volatile. While
disparity is generally hard to quantify, this aspect appears to be of minor relevance for
any measure of the long-term energy supply risk. Therefore, our concept focuses on
the properties of variety and balance alone.
There are two prominent indices marrying variety to balance (JANSEN et al.
2004:18): The first is HERFINDAHL’s (1950) concentration index,
H :=
K
∑
k=1
a2k, (9)
where in our context ak may reflect the shares in a variety of fuels and energy sources
employed for satisfying a nation’s total energy consumption. Alternatively, ak may
stand for the contributions of diverse export countries to the domestic supply of a fossil
fuel.
Second, there is SHANNON’s (1948) measure of entropy, frequently called
SHANNON-WIENER index:
S := −
K
∑
k=1
ak · ln ak. (10)
Roughly speaking, both measures are of inverse character: While HERFINDAHL’s index
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H is a concentration measure, which is also known as HERFINDAHL-HIRSCHMANN
index and used to assist the U. S. Federal Trade Commission in the assessment of hori-
zontal mergers (FTC, 1992), the SHANNON-WIENER index S is an indicator of evenness.
Accordingly, H takes on its maximum value of unity for the most unequal distribution,
such as a1 = 1, a2 = 0, ..., aK = 0, whereas S adopts its lowest value of zero in this
polar case of highest concentration. On the other hand, for the opposite polar case of
a perfectly even distribution, a1 = a2 = ... = aK = 1/K, which displays the lowest
concentration given a fixed number K of alternatives, H takes on its minimum value of
1/K > 0, whereas S equals its maximum of ln K, with both extreme values depending
upon the number K of alternatives. Since the range of values of both indices is deter-
mined by these two opposite polar cases, H is restricted to values lying in the interval
[1/K, 1], while those of S fall within the range of [0, ln K].
Hence, S is not normalized in the sense that its concrete values lie within the in-
terval of [0, 1]. In contrast, H is normalized, as [1/K, 1] ⊂ [0, 1]. This is a particularly
desirable property that facilitates international and inter-temporal comparisons, as in
practice one would like to know whether there are benchmarks in the form of fixed
minimum and maximum values. S, on the other hand, is not limited, but logarithmi-
cally increases with K.8
Given the choice between these two indices, we deliberately base our energy sup-
ply risk indicator on HERFINDAHL’s index, as it is better suited to reflect the risks as-
sociated with non-diversified energy portfolios than the SHANNON-WIENER index (LE
COQ, PALTSEVA, 2009:4475). This is due to the fact that the SHANNON-WIENER in-
dex puts relatively more weight on small market participants, whereas HERFINDAHL’s
index places more emphasis on larger suppliers that may cause serious security prob-
lems.
8By means of modification, JANSEN et al. (2004) demonstrate that S can be readily normalized into a
[0,1] scale.
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Appendix B: Properties of our Risk Indicator
Proposition I: The fuel-specific supply risk, given by
risk f = x2f d · rd +
J
∑
j=1
x2f jrj,
is normalized: 0 ≤ risk f ≤ 1.
Proof of Proposition I: The fuel-specific risk f is non-negative because it is a sum of non-
negative risk elements r f multiplied by squared, and thus also non-negative, weights
xij. That risk f is lower or equal than unity follows from rj ≤ 1, rd ≤ 1, x2f j ≤ x f j for
0 ≤ x f j ≤ 1, x2f d ≤ x f d for 0 ≤ x f d ≤ 1:
x2f d · rd +
J
∑
j=1
x2f jrj ≤ x2f d +
J
∑
j=1
x2f j ≤ x f d +
J
∑
j=1
x f j = 1.
Proposition II: The total supply risk, risk = wT ·Π ·w, is normalized:
0 ≤ risk ≤ 1,
where wT := (w1, ..., w f , ..., wF) and w1 + ...+wF = 1. Π’s diagonal elements pi f f equal
the fuel-specific risks, pi f f = risk f = x2f drd + ∑j x
2
f jrj, while the off-diagonal elements
are given by pi f1 f2 = x f1dx f2drd +∑
J
j x f1 jx f2 jrj, f1 6= f2.
Proof of Proposition II: While according to Proposition 1 the fuel-specific risk pi f f =
risk f is normalized, it is now first shown that 0 ≤ pi f1 f2 ≤ 1 for f1 6= f2. As a sum
of products of exclusively non-negative factors, it is evident that pi f1 f2 is non-negative.
Furthermore, pi f1 f2 does not exceed unity, as rd ≤ 1, rj ≤ 1, 0 ≤ x f1d, 0 ≤ x f1 j, and
0 ≤ x f2d ≤ 1 as well as 0 ≤ x f2 j ≤ 1:
pi f1 f2 = x f1dx f2drd +
J
∑
j
x f1 jx f2 jrj ≤ x f1dx f2d +
J
∑
j
x f1 jx f2 j ≤ x f1d +
J
∑
j
x f1 j = 1.
Second, based on 0 ≤ pi f1 f2 ≤ 1 for all f1, f2 = 1, ..., F, it follows from w1 + ...+ wF = 1
that
risk = wT ·Π ·w =
F
∑
f1=1
F
∑
f2=1
w f1 ·pi f1 f2 ·w f2 ≤
F
∑
f1=1
F
∑
f2=1
w f1 ·w f2 = (
F
∑
f1=1
w f1) · (
F
∑
f2=1
w f2) = 1.
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Several other properties of risk indicator (1) deserve noting: First, defining the
fuel-specific risk on the basis of a quadratic form implies that the risk contribution of an
export country j that provides for only a small fraction of, say, x f j = 3 % of the domestic
supply is rather negligible. The weight x2f j of such a country in expression (1) is as low
as 0.0009. Using squared shares as weights seems to be sensible, as in practice export
countries with small contributions to the domestic supply should be quite irrelevant
for a nation’s energy security situation.9
Second, given variety, improving the import balance among countries with
the same risk characterization should diminish the supply risk. In formal
terms, given xTf := (x f d, x f 1, ..., x f j, ..., xi J), where without any loss of generality
x f (J−1) > x f J and rJ−1 = rJ , the more balanced distribution given by xˆTf :=
(x f d, x f 1, ..., x f (J−2), xˆ f (J−1), xˆ f J) with xˆ f (J−1) = xˆ f J = (x f (J−1) + x f J)/2, indeed leads
to a lower supply risk:
r̂isk f := xˆTf ·R · xˆ f = x2f d · rd +
J−2
∑
j=1
x2f jrj + 2rJ(
x f (J−1) + x f J
2
)2 < x2f d · rd +
J
∑
j=1
x2f jrj = risk f .
This holds because
2rJ(
x f (J−1) + x f J
2
)2 =
rJ
2
(x2f (J−1)+ 2x f Jx f (J−1)+ x
2
f J) <
rJ
2
(2x2f (J−1)+ 2x
2
f J) = rJ(x
2
f (J−1)+ x
2
f J),
as (x f (J−1) − x f J)2 > 0 for x f (J−1) > x f J and, hence, 2x f Jx f (J−1) < x2f (J−1) + x2f J .
Third, given a perfectly balanced supply situation x f of fuel f characterized by
x f d = x f 1 = ... = x f j = ... = x f J , it is obvious that any risk indicator should mono-
tonically decrease with an increasing variety of imports, provided that the additional
imports originate from further export countries that display no risks. Finally, it is in-
tuitive that increasing diversification by splitting up the imports originating from a
9In a similar vein, the so-called penalization functions emerging from the mathematical and statistical
literature are frequently of quadratic nature. Besides HERFINDAHL’s index and the mean-squared error
(GREENE 1993:94), another prominent example of a statistical penalization function is the sum of squared
residuals that is minimized with respect to the parameters to be estimated when using the method of
Ordinary Least Squares. Using this method implies that larger residuals get a higher penalty than small
residuals. This appears to be reasonable, as small residuals may reflect chance, whereas large residuals
may be due to systematic deviations.
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single country, say country J, would reduce the supply risk if the contribution x f J is
then shared by two countries with the same risk characterization rJ = rJ+1, so that
x f J = x˜ f J + x˜ f (J+1).
20
Appendix C: OECD and World Bank Indicators
Table C1: Normalized OECD and World Bank Risk Indicators.
Country Risk Country Risk
OECD World Bank OECD World Bank
Algeria 0.43 0.61 Netherlands 0.00 0.09
Angola 0.86 0.68 Nigeria 0.86 0.72
Canada 0.00 0.09 Norway 0.00 0.07
China 0.29 0.52 Poland 0.29 0.37
Colombia 0.57 0.56 Russia 0.43 0.61
Ecuador 1.00 0.67 Saudi-Arabia 0.29 0.49
Germany 0.00 0.13 South Africa 0.43 0.38
Iran 0.86 0.68 U.S. 0.00 0.18
Iraq 1.00 0.85 United Arab Emirates 0.29 0.29
Kuwait 0.29 0.37 United Kingdom 0.00 0.12
Libya 1.00 0.59 Venezuela 0.86 0.72
Mexico 0.29 0.50 Others 1.00 1.00
Sources: OECD (2008), World Bank (2008). Note: 1 stands for extremely instable countries, whereas
0 indicates stable countries.
Covering 209 countries, the five so-called Aggregate Governance Indicators pro-
vided by the World Bank (2008) account for political stability, government effectiveness,
regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. The values of these security
indicators lie between -2.3 in the worst case and approximately 1.9 for the best condi-
tions. To allow for comparisons with the OECD classifications, we have normalized
each of the five indicators to range between 0 and 1, first by shifting each indicator to
the positive realm before dividing the outcomes by the highest values of the individual
indicators, respectively. For each indicator, the results have then been subtracted from
1 to get a risk, rather than a security classification. Finally, taking the country-specific
means of the modified indicators provides for the figures reported in Table C1.
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